Are you telling me that Digital IDs don’t operate with a private/public key model; with the private key stored and inaccessible in a chip leveraging WebAuthn (or WebAuthn-like) privacy-respecting tech from a trusted vendor like Yubico; with unique IDs generated per vendor the user signs up with; all within the ID cards/driver licenses that are freely issued by the government; with the ability for a user to mark another WebAuthn device (like a Yubikey) as trusted/untrusted through a government portal that undergoes regular security audits? Because if they did, the scenarios you outlined wouldn’t be feasible without someone’s device (and PIN) being physically taken or the vendor’s site being compromised.
The government would still be able to determine what you viewed if they had access to the sites’ internal data and the vendors stored your info, but that would still require a warrant.
And if they don’t use that or a similar approach, the approach they’re using for their “Digital IDs” is probably garbage.